Seminar paper from the year 2008 in the subject Politics - Basics and General, grade: A-, University of Toronto, language: English, abstract: This paper will argue that Tsebelis' nested games framework has extended the boundaries of traditional rational choice analysis by bringing together assumptions of rational choice and institutionalism. It would be reasonable to state that Tsebelis is a rational choice institutionalist who builds his theory on two propositions: that the behaviour of individuals is statistically rational, and that it is also rule-governed. This approach makes the 'Nested Games' volume particularly valuable for the body of literature attempting to depart from the pattern of simplistic explanations of human behaviour. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly outline the nested games framework developed by Tsebelis, including principles upon which it is built. I proceed with the discussion of the complexity of the rational choice theory and the logic of institutional design. Finally, the paper concludes with the assessment of universality, scientific value and empirical content of Tsebelis's model in comparative perspective.